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ABSTRACT
The SARS-CoV-2 outbreak changed the everyday life of almost all the people over the world. Cur-
rently, we are facing with the problem of containing the spread of the virus both using the more
effective forced lockdown, which has the drawback of slowing down the economy of the involved
countries, and by identifying and isolating the positive individuals, which, instead, is an hard task
in general due to the lack of information. For this specific disease, the identificato of the infected is
particularly challenging since there exists cathegories, namely the asymptomatics, who are positive
and potentially contagious, but do not show any of the symptoms of SARS-CoV-2. Until the devel-
opement and distribution of a vaccine is not yet ready, we need to design ways of selecting those
individuals which are most likely infected, given the limited amount of tests which are available
each day.
In this paper, we make use of available data collected by the so called contact tracing apps to de-
velop an algorithm, namely PPTO, that identifies those individuals that are most likely positive and,
therefore, should be tested. While in the past these analysis have been conducted by centralized
algorithms, requiring that all the app users data are gathered in a single database, our protocol is
able to work on a device level, by exploiting the communication of anonymized information to other
devices.
1 Introduction
The health emergency is the first challenge each country is facing in the fight to SARS-CoV-2. The next challenge,
even more critical, is the safe reactivation of the production processes to prevent economic and social crises. Although
the specialists agree that the study of a vaccine will have success, its distribution to the whole population will require
more than one year, thus forcing a long coexistence with the virus. During this time, it will be of crucial importance
to understand how the infection is spreading across the population and to take the best countermeasures to contain it
without further lockdowns. The epidemicmodels currently used provide a macro-scale description of the spread, which
allows to forecast the hospitals’ load during the lockdown, but are partially ineffective when preventing the lockdown.
An effective tool to partially analyse the current virus spread situations and identify the presence of infected individuals
is the use of swabs, which have been used extensively Nonetheless, the limited availability and the time required to
test a large number of subjects, makes them only a partial answer to the reconstruction of the disease transmission
among the population. The scientific community agrees that contact-tracing applications could provide micro-scale
data useful to contain the infection by driving the choice of the daily swab selection process. These applications can
generate millions of punctual data that are combined with the clinical data available to ATS to reconstruct infection
chains and networks, so as to identify potentially infected people.1 At the moment, only direct contacts with the
proven positive subjects are tested for SARS-CoV-2, while a more accurate analysis can suggest to test those subjects
which have high probability of being infected but only had an indirect contact with the positive one. However, dealing
with the data is intractable for humans and, therefore, Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques are commonly considered
1 https://www.immuni.italia.it/
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the most promising technology for such tasks. Indeed, AI is capable of producing predictive models from data and
reasoning on them to suggest where and when to use swabs to test for infected people. However, the potential of these
techniques is not fully understood yet, and, more importantly, their applicability is limited by severe European privacy
regulation. Also for this reason, most of the current research regarding the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 are focused on
the analysis of the behaviour of the disease, e.g., with or without the countermeasures used by the different nations.
Conversely, the scientific literature do not focus on decisional methods, able to lead the selection of the individuals
to be tested during the daily tests for SARS-CoV-2. In this work, we present an AI-based algorithm, namely PPTO,
capable, in a distributed fashion as to avoid the violation of the privacy regulation, of identifying two classes of people
whose roles are prominent in the infection: asymptomatic and presymptomatic subjects. The former ones are an
important fraction of the infected people and their identification is difficult, while the latter ones can transmit the virus
with high probability. Our algorithm exploits a recently developed micro-scale epidemic model Ferretti et al. (2020)
to reconstruct the infection chains from tracing app data and ranks the individuals according to the likelihood of being
infected, so that the limited amount of daily tests available to the healthcare authorities can be used effectively.
2 Related Works
A large effort has been put in the modeling of the disease with predictive models depending on the different areas
of diffusion of the virus, e.g., Girardi et al. (2020); Gaeta (2020) for Italy, Toubiana and Bouaud (2020) for France,
and Chen et al. (2020) for China, assuming an evolution over time of the virus behaviour Li et al. (2020), or analysing
the effect of different contagion containment countermeasures Hsiang et al. (2020); Liu et al. (2020a) or monitoring
strategies Peak et al. (2020). A broader study tried to identify the factors influencing the virus spread over the dif-
ferent countries Staszkiewicz et al. (2020), concluding that the spread and mortality is determined by the number of
connections among the continent, e.g., the airline traffic, but also by some local characteristic of the country, e.g., the
availability of medical personnel and the average air pollution. The above-mentioned studies are mainly based on data
regarding the number of contagion and on mathematical models of the evolution a generic diseases. Even if these are
studies which are of interest in the management of medical resources and the economical impact of different measures,
they do not provide any indication on the best strategies to select the individuals to test. Moreover, they do not take
into account explicitly the data of the connections between individuals, which are the main cause of the disease spread
for the SARS-CoV-2 virus.
Prasse et al. studies the evolution of the disease over the network, using a large scale approximation of the contacts,
i.e., the model each city in a specific region as a single node. This way we might take decision on a macroscale,
i.e., how many test distribute in the different areas, but no suggestions on the single individuals are provided.
In Shaghaghian and Coates (2017), the goal is to infer the path that an infection has traversed in order to reach an
arbitrary node in the SI epidemiological model. Similar to what is been done here, but does not provide a clear de-
cision on the tests to perform. Using message passing algorithms Lokhov et al. (2014) and statistical inference, by
maximum likelihood approach, Antulov-Fantulin et al. (2014) on the disease graph to infer the origin. Based on the
SIR epidemiological model and assumes to have a fixed network structure.
However, most of the proposed solutions are not viable since they requires that the information about the contacts
between couple of individuals are stored and elaborated in a centralized manner. This constitutes a problem in terms
of privacy, since a single attack to such a centralized unit would compromise the information about the contacts among
the entire population. An alternative solution is the use of tracing apps, which can be used to identify the individuals
with the most likelihood of being infected and their selection for the SARS-CoV-2 swab test (see Ahmed et al. (2020)
for an extensive review). It has been proven that this strategy would greatly reduce the contagion curve Yasaka et al.
(2020). None the less, even the use of specific apps raised some privacy concerns Tang (2020), e.g., the one developed
for Singapore, namely TraceTogether. Therefore, in the last apps adopted by governments a specific protocol, namely
PACT Chan et al. (2020), is adopted. Using the guidelines provided by this protocol, the contact tracing apps are
only allowed to exchange some identification codes, which should be changed frequently, between devices owned
by individuals who entered in contact between each others. From the technological point of view Apple and Google
are developing the guidelines for Bluetooth-based contact tracing apps.2 This allows the people using these apps to
preserve the personal information about the contacts she/he had in the past days and, at the same time, allow the
authorities to determine which are the people who have been the most exposed to infected individuals. The method
we are going to design is based on such apps and is in line with the PACT protocol and uses apps in line with the
Apple-Google technological guidelines.
2https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing.
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3 Preliminaries
3.1 Epidemic Model
In this work, we use a new epidemic model that allows us to simulate the spread in a fine-grained fashion. In this
model, namely SAPSR, at each time t, the individuals of a population U are partitioned into 5 classes:
• St: susceptibles individuals that never contracted the the virus and, therefore, can be potentially infected;
• At: asymptomatics individuals that have been infected, which will not manifest any symptoms during the
development of the disease;
• Pt: presymptomatics individuals that have been infected, but they did not have symptoms yet;
• Yt: symptomatics individuals that have been infected and have symptoms;
• Rt: recovered individuals that have been either asymptomatics or symptomatics, but are not infected anymore.
This category cannot infect other people and are immune to the disease.
The idea of differentiating asymptomatic and presymptomatic individuals has been presented by Ferretti et al. (2020),
and has been specifically designed to properly model the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak dynamics. According to this study,
the virus transmission is mainly conveyed by asyntomatics and presymptomatics individuals. Indeed, symptomatic
people are less likely to spread the contagion since they usually are promptly isolated as symptoms occur, while
asymptomatics and presymptomatics have frequent contacts with susceptibles individuals, which consequently are
more likely infected by individuals from these categories. However, once a contact occurs, symptomatics have the
largest probability to infect a new individual, followed by presymptomatics and asymptomatics, who have the lowest
probability of passing the disease. Therefore, the probability of passing the disease should be differentiated among the
three categories.
In what follows, we describe a model of contacts and contagions among individuals. We describe the set of possible
contacts occurring among different individuals using a graph Gc(U,Ec), where the nodes U represents the entire
population, and Ec is the set of undirected edges indicating if two nodes may have a contact. We associate a weight
wu,v(t) to each edge in E
c denoting the probability that two nodes u and v have a contact at time t. The rationale
behind the choice of setting a different value for each pair of nodes is that some individuals pairs has recurrent and
frequent contacts, e.g., family members, colleagues, and friends, while others have only sporadic encounters, e.g.,
people using public transportation. Notice that in the current studies we focus on the transmission of the virus by
direct contact between couple of people, i.e., occurred by exchanging respiratory droplets, since it has been shown that
the virus can only survive few hours outside the human body Khadka et al. (2020), which greatly decrease the chance
of an indirect contagion.
A contact cu,v(t) is a tuple (lu,v, ru,v, t), where lu,v denotes the distance between the individuals, ru,v denotes the
duration of the contact, and t is the time the contact between u and v occurred.3 Let us denote withwu,v the probability
that a specific contact between u and v occurs, and with C = {cu,v(t)} the set of all the contacts occurred between
pair of nodes over a predefined time span, e.g., over two weeks. The contagion probability p(u, v, lu,v, ru,v) between
two individuals u and v depends on the state of the two nodes (one of them should be susceptible and one should
have contracted the SARS-CoV-2), and on the duration ru,v and distance lu,v of the contact. More specifically, once
a susceptible node u ∈ St get infected, it is removed from the population St and it is included either in At or Pt
according to the value of the probability of being symptomatic ps(u). If an individual becomes asymptomatic at a
specific time t0, she/he will remain in the asymptomatic population At for a time span of t ∈ (t0, t0 + τu), where
τu is the time required by an asymptomatic u to recover from the virus, i.e., to result not infected anymore, and may
vary for each specific individual. Subsequently, at time t0 + τu, she/he will be included in the recovered population
Rt0+τu . Conversely, if an individual becomes presymptomatic at time t0, she/he will remain in the population Pt for
t ∈ (t0, t0 + τu), and at time t + ǫu, she/he will be included in the symptomatic population Yt+ǫu , where ǫu denotes
the incubation time that might be different for each individual.
We now describe how the containment measures affect the contact and contagion probabilities among individuals. At
each time t, a set of Kt nodes can be tested. Each test is associated to a value vt ∈ Vt defined by a tuple (u, ou,t),
where u is the node tested and ou,t ∈ {POSITIVE, NEGATIVE, WAITING} is the test outcome. The probability of
getting a false negative is pf (ut) that depends on the population to which u belongs. Notice that the model we
presented is flexible enough to be applied to infections others than the SARS-CoV-2 one. Indeed, modifying the
3 Even though, other variables can be relevant to determine the contagion probability, here, we focus only on these two informa-
tion since they are the most commonly traced by contact tracing apps and have been shown to be among the most relevant for the
spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus Khadka et al. (2020).
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Algorithm 1 Epidemic simulation
Input: population sets S0, A0, P0, Y0, R0, contacts graph G
c, time horizon T , tests policy P
Output: sets ST , AT , PT , YT ,RT
C ← ∅, V ← ∅, D ← ∅, t← 0
for t ∈ {1, . . . , T} do
Cnew ← ∅
for u, v ∈ U do
if a contact occurred between u and v then
Cnew ← Cnew ∪ cu,v,t
(Du, Dv)← updateDevicesData(Du , Dv , cu,v,t)
(St, At, Pt, Yt, Rt)← contagionStep(Cnew , St−1, At−1, Pt−1, Yt−1, Rt−1)
V ← V ∪ TestsPolicy(C,V, Yt)
Algorithm 2 updateDevicesData(Du, Dv, cu,v,t)
Input: devices dataDu,Dv , new contact cu,v,t
Output: updated data (Du, Dv)
hu,t ← RandomToken()
hv,t ← RandomToken()
Du ← Du ∪ {(t, hu,t, hv,t, lu,v, ru,v)}
Dv ← Dv ∪ {(t, hv,t, hu,t, lu,v, ru,v)}
contagion probabilities p(u, v, lu,v, ru,v) as well as the false negative rate pf (ut), one might model also a large class
of outbreaks.
In Algorithm 1, we provide a high level description about how our the interaction between couple of individuals is
modeled. We are given with the initial populations S0, A0, P0, Y0, and R0, the contact graph G
c, and a given time
horizon T for which we apply a tests policy P to limit the spread. At first, we initialize the set V of the individuals
we already tested for SARS-CoV-2, the set C of the contacts occurred so far, and the setD containing the information
registered by all the devices. Initially, they are all empty. At each time t, we determine if a new contact occurred
between each pair of individuals, which are stored in Cnew , and the corresponding data Du and Dv are stored in the
devices of the two individuals u and v (detailed in Algorithm 2). For each of the new contacts in Cnew we determine
if a contagion between the involved nodes occurred (detailed in Algorithm 3), and update the populations St, At, Pt,
Yt, and Rt depending if the contagion caused the creation of a new asymptomatic or presymptomatic infection and
on the recovery of some of the individuals. Finally, we establish which are the nodes to be tested according to a tests
policy P . The tested individuals, in case of positive outcome, will be isolated and, therefore, will not have contacts
with other individuals in the following period.
Contract tracing apps represent one the main tools that the governments adopted to tackle this outbreak. Though
in some countries these tools can collect fine grained data including, beyond contacts, personal and GPS information,
most of the European countries developed solutions that aim also at preserving privacy by introducing some constraints
on how data can be collected. These constraints brought the development of different solutions that exploit Bluetooth
technologies and security protocols to preserve users privacy. In what follows, we focus on the general schema
followed by Immuni, the official Italian contact tracing application.4 The data update procedure occurring on each
individual’s device is detailed in Algorithm 2. It generates for each contact a random code, a.k.a. token, hu,t and
hv,t for each individual involved in a contact. Subsequently, it updates the data stored in each individual’s device
Du and Dv with an entry listing the time t the contact occurred, the tokens of the two individuals and the distance
lu,v and duration ru,v of the contact. To summarize, each entry d ∈ Du in a user’s u device database is a tuple
d = (t, hu,t, hv,t, lu,v, ru,v) characterizing the contact she/he has had in the past.
The evolution of the populations set describing the virus evolution is detailed in Algorithm 3. At first if checks if any
new contact in Cnew generated a new infected individual, according to the contagion probability p(u, v, lu,v, ru,v).
According to the response of the individuals, i.e., she/he can be categorized as a presymptomatic or an asymptomatic
patient, she/he is moved from the susceptible set S to either the set P or A, respectively. After that, we check if
any presymptomatic u ∈ P showed some symptoms and, therefore, is moved to the symptomatic set Y . Finally, the
contagion evolves by moving the status of all the asymptomatics and symptomatics who recovered to the set R.
4 These are also the features offered by most of the privacy-aware contact tracing applications.
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Algorithm 3 contagionStep(Cnew, S, A, P, Y,R)
Input: new contacts set Cnew, population sets S, A, P , Y , R
Output: updated populations sets S, A, P , Y , R
for cu,v,t ∈ Cnew do
if u ∈ S ∧ v ∈ {A ∪ P ∪ Y } then
x = u
if v ∈ S ∧ u ∈ {A ∪ P ∪ Y } then
x = v
if a contagion occurred then
S ← S \ {x}
if the contagion is symptomatic then
P ← P ∪ {x}
else
A← A ∪ {x}
for u ∈ P do
if u expressed some symptoms then
P ← P \ {u}
Y ← Y ∪ {u}
for u ∈ A ∪ Y do
if u recovered then
A← A \ {u}
Y ← Y \ {u}
R← R ∪ {u}
4 Problem Formulation
Given a population U and a time horizon T ∈ N, ideally, we aim at finding, at each day t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, a subset
Xt ⊂ U of Kt nodes we isolate to minimize the spread of the virus in the population, i.e., that minimizes the total
number of infected over the time horizon T . However, solving such a problem would require a complete knowledge
of the contact network C in terms of contacts and contagion probabilities. Unfortunately, in our scenario, these
information are not available since the structure of the network changes over time, and due to the privacy policies
of the contact tracing apps. Indeed we are able only to exploit the data coming from the different devices Du in a
decentralized manner, since it is not allowed to collect centralized contacts data. Therefore, a natural reformulation of
the problem when this information is lacking consist in assuming that all the individuals might have contact with each
other individuals, or, formally, that the contact graph is completeGc.
As a consequence, we are allowed only to use as available data the device databaseDu, and the probability of getting
infected for each contact between individuals p(u, v, du,v, ru,v). We reformulate the problem of minimizing the virus
spread as the task of finding, at a time step t, the subset of nodes Xt ∈ U with the Kt largest probability of being
contagious. Furthermore, assuming that an individual can be isolated if she/he has evident symptoms or after resulting
positive from a test, and that the symptomatic individuals are known, the problem can be formally cast as the one of
selecting the nodes that with largest probability of being contagious pc(u):
Xt = arg max
X∈Zk
∑
u∈X
pc(u) (1)
s.t. |Xt| = Kt, (2)
where | · | denotes the cardinality operator. In what follows, we describe the algorithm able to estimate the probabilities
pc(u), inducing the policy P to perform the swab tests for SARS-CoV-2.
5 Proposed Method
We start by introducing the assumptions required by our method. Our solution aim at exploiting a huge amount of data
collected by the devices of the individuals to select the individuals which are most likely infected. The effectiveness
of this method is strictly related to the individuals collaboration. Indeed, as shown by some previous study, it is
necessary that a large portion of the individuals uses the contact tracing applications. Moreover, we require that all the
individuals that present symptoms or results to be positive to a test communicate it to the local authorities, so that this
information can be exploited to send notifications to high-risk individuals.
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Algorithm 4 PPTO - Main
Input: number of available testsK, number of iterationsN , current time step t, time window tw, set of newly positive discovered
individuals Qt, contacts of the positive individuals ci
Output: individuals to testXt
for n ∈ {1, . . . , N} do
Sample randomly node i ∈ Qt
sendRequest(n, ci, t)
S = ∅
while StopCondition=False do
s = ListenScores()
S = S ∪ s
Xt = selectTopK(S,K)
sendNotifications(Xt )
The key idea of our method, namely Privacy Preserving Test Optimization (PPTO), is to exploit all devices to find
the solution of the problem in Equation 1. Indeed, a distributed computation of the solution satisfies the privacy
requirements imposed by the privacy-preserving policy of the governments. Starting from the devices of symptomatic
(positive) individuals, we aim at identifying asymptomatic and presymptomatic individuals by reconstructing infection
trajectories, i.e., path of infection occurred by contacts between couple of people, exploiting the contact tracing apps
data. The algorithm assign at each user a score representing the infection risk level and indicating how many times
a monte carlo-simulated infection trajectory included its device. Finally, given a limited amount of K available tests,
the algorithm will suggests a set Xt of theK individuals with the highest score.
In Algorithm 4 we provide a the core algorithm of our method, while Algorithm 5 we provide the operations required
by the devices to allow a decentralized manner. The PPTO algorithm takes as input the number of available tests K ,
the number of iterations N , the current time step t and a time window tw for which we have to look for contagious
people during the past time steps. The definition of the iteration N is required to limit the computational effort of
the algorithm we run. Moreover, the algorithm required to have the set of nodes Qt that recently, i.e., in the last
tw time steps, resulted to be positive in a test and communicated it to the authorities together with her/his the set of
tokens used in the recent past, i.e., for each node i ∈ Qt, we need ci = {hi,j}
t
j=t−tw
. Then, for N iterations, the
algorithm samples a positive infected node i fromQt and simulate trajectories starting from it. A simulation is started
by sending a request (sendRequest(n, ci, t)) to the device associated to the token ci. This request message provides
also the information about the index of the current iteration n and the time instant t from which we want to start a
trajectory. Each device i receives all the requests sent to the network, but only if the token transmitted in the request
message is included in device dataset Di, then the score g is incremented, a flag fn associated to the current iteration
n is set to True and the trajectory is propagated backward and forward to other network nodes, where the details of
these procedures are described in Algorithm 6 and Algorithm 7, respectively. Finally, once a stop condition is satisfied,
e.g., after a pre-specified time has passed, each device u communicates its score s to a central unit, so that it can
communicate the set Xt ofK individuals with the largest score.
Using Algorithm 6 the trajectory is propagated backward to one of the contacts c ∈ CB , with c =
(t′, hu,t′ , hv,t′ , lu,v, ru,v), that occurred for all time steps j ∈ {t− tw, . . . , t} according to a probability mass function
γ(c). This function represents an unnormalized probability that a node is infected and is defined using the duration,
distance, and order in which each contacts occurred:
γ(c) =
[ ∏
c′∈CB :t′′<t′
(1 − pc(l
′
u,v, r
′
u,v))
]
pc(lu,v, ru,v), (3)
where c′ = (t′′, hu,t′′ , hv,t′′ , l
′
u,v, r
′
u,v). Finally, according to the probability distribution induced by γ(c) a single
contact cˆ is selected and a request is sent for the token hˆ corresponding to the current device from cˆ.
In Algorithm 7 the trajectory is forward propagated to the contacts c occurred at time j ∈ {t, . . . , t + tw} according
to the contagion probability pc(lu,v, ru,v). More specifically, we send the token of the current device h present in
the contact c if after the contagion occurred, i.e., we model this event as a Bernoulli variable with expected value
pc(lu,v, ru,v)).
6 Discussion and Future Works
In thi paper we presented a novel algorithm for the identification of individuals that have high probability to spread
the infection during the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak. We showed how to use the so called contact tracing apps and the data
6
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Algorithm 5 PPTO - Device Side
Input: number of iterations N , starting time step t, time window tw
Output: score g
Initialize score g ← 0
Initialize fj ← False,∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}
while Stop Condition = False do
(h, n)← waitRequest()
if ∃d = (t′, hu,t′ , hv,t′ , lu,v, ru,v), d ∈ Du | hv,t′ = h ∧ fn = False then
fn ← True
g ← g + 1
backwardTrajectory(t′ , n, tw)
forwardTrajectory(t′ , n, tw)
x = randomCode()
s = (x, g)
sendScore(s)
Algorithm 6 backwardTrajectory(t′, n, tw)
Input: starting time t′, iteration index n, time window tw
CB ← {d = (j, hu,j , hv,j , lu,v, ru,v), d ∈ Di : t
′ − tw < j < t
′}
for c ∈ CB do
γ(c) computed as in Equation (3)
Sample a contact cˆ ∈ CB according to the distribution γ(c)∑
e∈CB
γ(e)
Extract the token hˆ corresponding to the current device from cˆ
sendRequest(n, hˆ)
Algorithm 7 forwardTrajectory(t′, n, tw)
Input: starting time tx, iteration index n, time window tw
CF = {d = (j, hu,j , hv,j , lu,v, ru,v), d ∈ Di : t
′ < j < t′ + tw}
for c ∈ CF do
simulate a contagion with probability pc(lu,v, ru,v)
if the contagion occurred then
Extract the token h corresponding to the current device from c
sendRequest(n, h)
stored therein, to provide with a suggestions on the individuals to test for the positivity of the virus. This is crucial
task for the containment of the contagion, due to the limited number of available tests the public healt organization are
able to perform each day. Our algorithm suggests the set of individuals that should be tested to limit the spread by an
innovative AI-based algorithm which communicate only by means of token generated by the different devices, thus
preserving the private information of the app users.
As immediate future work, we will evaluate our method in realistic scenarios comparing it with tests policies currently
employed by governments. However, simulating realistic scenarios is a hard task since the true values of some of the
parameters of our epidemic model are still unknowkn to the scientific community, such as the probability of being
asymptomatic, the contagion probability given a contact. For this reason, beyond exploiting information provided by
new works in the scientific literature, we will design methods to estimate them by combining aggregated data about
this epidemics. Furthermore, a further improvementwill be the development of a framework in which these parameters
can be estimated online gathering information trough the tests.
In this work, we focused on designing an algorithm that satisfies the privacy requirements. However, in real world
scenarios, though this approach is designed to preserve privacy, some malicious users could attack the system to falsify
the outcome of the algorithm. This issue, together with other securities aspects, should be further investigated to make
this method usable in practice. Moreover, it would be interesting to compare our method with other state-of-the-art AI
solutions that exploits centralized datasets to infer the probability of each individual of being contagious, and provide
an analysis of the trade-off between privacy requirements satisfaction and effectiveness on the epidemics containment.
7
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